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Abstract 
On the night of November 8th 2016 Donald Trump won the US presidential election 
with 306 electoral votes (vs. 232 for Hilary Clinton).  Most notably, all of the 
numerous election forecasts failed to predict Trump´s victory. It was preceded by 
Trump´s unforeseen achievement in the primaries. The main question arises “Who 
exactly voted for him?”. In this regard we analyze the primaries of the Republican 
Party of 2016. Given the total failure of survey-based polls we base our empirical 
analysis on socio-demographic factors of the electoral constituency at county-level 
(2764 counties) to predict Trump´s actual voting shares.    
The regression analyses show that a larger proportion of White Americans leads to 
an increasing share of votes for Trump. But there is no statistically significant impact 
of the share of Evangelical Protestants. By contrast, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that a large proportion of veterans in the population goes hand in hand with Trump´s 
success. The study also outlines that low education, low income and a high 
unemployment rate have a positive impact on votes cast for Trump. However, the 
population density has no influence. Thus, beside the aforementioned socio-
demographic variables the rural versus urban difference per se has no explanatory 
power. 
Yet, these variables together explain only 13 percent of the variance of the vote 
shares of Trump. The momentum effect that is, the time a primary took place in a 
county increases this explained variance. But in fact, state specific differences of 
Trump’s votes are by far the most relevant factor. Thus, the regression analyses 
prove once more the fact that the United States of America are no homogenous 
country. Beside differences in income, education, employment and population 
density, cultural or traditional values and other deep-rooted regional disparities 
matter as well.  
JEL classification: D72  
Keywords: Voting, US, primaries 2016, election, Trump, Socio-demographic 
influences, bandwagon, states 
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1 Introduction 
On the night of November 8th 2016 Donald Trump won the US presidential election 
with 306 electoral votes (vs. 232 for Hilary Clinton). Even considering that Mrs. 
Clinton slightly leads in the popular vote this outcome was a big surprise. All of the 
numerous election forecasts failed to predict this victory (Graefe 2016). Most 
surprisingly the sophisticated methods of ex-ante voter polls in order to predict actual 
voter behavior were not able to reveal Trumps real support. 
This astonishing success was preceded by Trump´s unforeseen achievement in the 
primaries of the Republican Party. He declared on June 16th, 2015 that he is going to 
participate in the race for becoming president of the United States of America. In the 
Republican Party primaries Donald Trump started in a field of 17 people who were 
running for a presidential nomination, which is the largest number of candidates in 
history for the Republican Party (Linshi 2015). In summer 2015, in the polls he was 
able to overtake all his competitors but Jeb Bush who had the most consent among 
the presidential candidates at that time (Chinni 2015). But nonetheless, the majority 
of political observers still had doubts whether an unpredictable candidate Trump can 
win the nomination (Stewart 2016). In spite of his outsider campaign and his serious 
blunders, Donald Trump reached his goal in July 2016 and was able to clinch the 
Republican presidential nomination with the 1.237 delegates necessary. 
In this paper we analyze the primaries of the Republican Party occurring between 
February 1 and June 2016. Given the failure of survey-based polls we concentrate on 
aggregate socio-demographic factors of the electoral constituency at the county level 
to predict Trumps´ actual voting shares. The data set covers election results in the 
primaries of 2764 counties from all of the participating federal states. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the state of research as to factors predicting 
Trumps success in the Grand Old Party (GOP) primaries of 2016. Chapter 3 derives 
hypotheses and describes the database. Chapter 4 presents a multiple regression 
analysis. Finally in Chapter 5 we conclude and develop aspects of further research. 
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2 Current state of research 
Until early in 2017 there are very few scientific publications dealing with Trump´s 
election process, because the topic is relatively new. Thus, most of the actual studies 
discussed in this chapter will be descriptive. In addition, we consider analyses of 
former US primaries. But, due to the very different circumstances and nature we only 
touch on analyses of the presidential elections in general and also of November 8th.1   
An early descriptive research, published in November 2015, examined characteristics 
of Trump supporters (Jones et al. 2015). 55% of Republicans who support Trump are 
white working class, while the support for other Republican candidates only consists 
of 35% working class voters. Moreover, 60% of the white working-class say, that 
discrimination against whites (“reverse discrimination”) becomes a more important 
topic. This view is with 36% lower among whites with at least a college degree 
(Jones et al. 2015: 38).  
The above mentioned ethnical factor plays an important role in other researches as 
well. Hetherington and Engelhardt disclosed a descriptive analysis at the end of 
February 2016, a few days before Super Tuesday, where many elections in southern 
states took place. For this survey white Democrats and Republicans were asked to 
respond to certain statements about racial attitudes (Hetherington/Engelhardt 2016). 
The results were compared with a panel from 1986. They indicate that in 1986, the 
racial attitude of Democrats and Republicans did not differ much, while 2016 the 
racial resentments of white Republicans grew strongly and the racial resentments of 
Democrats slightly decreased. In a second step they include the variables Southern 
and Evangelical to White and Republican. Both variables enforce the tendency to 
stronger racial resentments and indicate a strong regional difference inside white 
evangelical Republicans.   
In March 2016 Irwin and Katz published and interim analysis for Trump´s election 
results (Irwin/Katz 2016). Their correlation analysis reveals that Trump is doing well 
in counties in which the inhabitants define themselves with a “white” identity and 
counties with prolonged economic dysfunctions, for example high unemployment. He 
also has strong support in places with a high share of people who did not finish high 
                                                     
1 As to the elections in the US the classical text is Campbell et al. (1960). Geys (2006), Lewis-Beck et 
al. (2008), Graefe (2013), Weisberg (2015) and Cancela/Geys (2016) provide actual overviews. As 
to forecasting elections see Hummel/Rothschild (2014). 
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school. But on the other hand Trump also has a strong backing from affluent and 
educated people. In addition, there are big regional differences not only related to an 
urban vs. rural cleavage. In this respect historical racial segregation may play an 
important role.  
Pew Research Centers´ poll released in July 2016 underlines the importance of 
religion and ethnicity (Pew Research Center 2016). The study shows that out of 100 
white protestant voters, 75 would vote for Donald Trump and 36 of them even 
strongly support him (Pew Research Center 2016: 4). On the other hand, if voters are 
religiously unaffiliated, only 23 out 100 people would give their vote for Trump. In 
addition, the religious composition of the registered voter for each party turns out to 
be relevant. The Republicans consist of 35% white evangelical Protestants and of 
18% white mainline Protestants: In total 53% white Protestants. To the contrary 
amongst black Protestants and Hispanic catholic voters, Trump has a much lower 
consent (Pew Research Center 2016: 16). 
Income and education of Trump supporters are the focus of an article in The 
Economist (Economist 2016a). The author figured that Trump had slightly more 
support among the voters with an income under $50.000 a year than on an average. 
For those voters with an income over $100.000, Trump achieved results closer to the 
average. In the state New York, he even gained 64% of the votes from people with 
an income higher than $100.000. Exit polls in Illinois show a strong support among 
Americans with a high income and college graduates and postgraduates make up to 
43% of his support. In summary, Trump is not only a candidate for the poor, less-
educated working class. He is giving a voice to disaffected blue-collar whites, but 
wealthy and educated republican voters contribute to his success (Economist 
2016a). 
The economic situation and the ethnical component are considered as predominantly 
responsible for Trump’s success in an article from NBC. Trump above all wins in 
states with an African American population over 8% and unemployment over the 
national average of 5% (Chinni 2016). The logic is not that Trump is able to win black 
voters but rather white citizens living in districts with large African American 
populations. In addition, he claims that polls are not relevant and momentum effects 
do not exist. 
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Guo (2016a, 2016b) claims that the financial situations of voters and education are 
the vital factors of election behavior. For education, the author compared the results 
of Trump with the percent of population with a college degree. The higher the 
percentage for people with a college degree was, the lower was the result for Trump. 
The income had a similar influence. The higher the medium income was, the lower 
was the result for Trump (Guo 2016a). In the same line, Trump loses about 2 
percentage point of his vote if additionally 12% of adults had jobs (Guo 2016b). 
Sides/Tesler (2016) and the Wall Street Journal (2016) confirm this finding. 
Economic and financial dissatisfaction of voters increases the support for Trump 
(Sides/Tesler 2016). The Wall Street Journal published an overview with important 
attributes of Trump supporters (The Wall Street Journal 2016): 60% of them have a 
lower income per year than $75.000 and 62% have no college degree. 
Trump seems to be favored by military dependents as well. A survey of Military 
Times indicates that Trump would have a big advantage against Clinton for the 
general election with about twice as much consent (Shane/Altman 2016). 
Additionally, exit polls in South Carolina indicate a strong support for Trump by 
military members or veterans. 35% of male and 31% of female veterans and military 
members voted for him. That is about 10% more votes for Trump than for Cruz or 
Rubio (Gamino/Clement 2016, see also Harress 2016). 
Bump (2014) investigates the role of population density in primaries. His analysis 
shows that voters in presidential elections living in cities tend to vote for Democrats 
while voters from rural areas prefer to vote for Republicans. Hamilton (2006) confirms 
this outcome as to presidential elections. Furthermore, a research of Desilver (2014) 
indicates that conservative people prefer to live in small cities and rural areas with 
people around them who share the same faith, while liberals prefer a mix of different 
races and ethnicities. An evaluation from Wisconsin reveals that Trump is especially 
successful in rural areas and looses voters in the bigger cities (Bishop 2016). This 
scheme might be applicable for other states in die US as well. 
Ali and Kartik underline the possibility of a „bandwagon-effect“ for elections (Ali/Kartik 
2008). They develop a theoretical model including a sequential voting process where 
every voter has got information about the history of votes for each candidate. As a 
result, voters can be influenced by such a string of elections. The descriptive analysis 
of Malhotra and Snowberg (2008) and Silver (2016) underline the relevance of the 
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sequence of the primaries. Candidates who are successful in the first primaries might 
have an advantage by creating a “bandwagon”. Those candidates can build 
momentum by getting covered by the media, attracting undecided voters and donors. 
In this analysis the authors examined whether the early primaries such as Iowa and 
New Hampshire have an impact on the results of later primaries in 2008. Dowdle at 
al. (2016) confirm this momentum effect by means of a regression analysis of the 
presidential nomination outcomes of 2016. 
In contrast to these predominantly descriptive evidence Rothwell and Diego-Rosell 
present a multiple probit regression analysis testing a battery of hypotheses. 
Furthermore, their analysis covers more than 50 independent variables and bases on 
a huge data set of 125,430 survey respondents (Rothwell/Diego-Rosell 2016). These 
are respondents of Gallup surveys from July 2015 to October 2016. The most 
relevant findings are: A higher level of education, i.e. a post-bachelor´s degree, leads 
to a lesser support for Trump. Ethnic affiliations and religion also play an important 
role. White respondents show a positive probability to be pro-Trump and the same 
holds as to respondents who claim “Religion is important”. This is also the case for 
veterans or family member of veterans. As to economic conditions a low household 
income and unemployment both have a positive influence. Furthermore, population 
density at the county level exhibits a negative influence on support for Trump 
(Rothwell/Diego-Rosell 2016: 13, 29). This survey is the most comprehensive dataset 
in order to predict Trump´s result in the presidential elections of November 2016. It 
too, completely failed to forecast Trump´s success. Of all of the respondents 63 % 
expressed an unfavorable view of Trump. Considering the actual election results 
these answers were for sure heavily biased.2 This underlines the necessity to base 
an analysis on actual voting outcomes and hard facts instead of the “answers” of a 
telephone survey.  
Finally, another factor that influences the results of the primary elections might be the 
cultural differences between regions. The USA are not a homogenous nation. They 
rather consist of cultural clusters, e.g. census regions and divisions. 
                                                     
2 We do not discuss the fact that in their paper Rothwell and Diego-Rosell provide a very peculiar 
evaluation of their probit regression. They do not give an interpretation of the coefficients of their 
model specification. Instead they use the size of the corresponding t-Tests as an indicator of the 
importance of an independent variable (Rothwell/Diego-Rosell 2016: 13). 
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In summary, the existing empirical evidence points to eight potential influence factors 
on Trump’s election success. These are the share of white population, evangelical 
Protestants, Veterans, poor education, unemployment rate, low income, population 
density, time related effects and other regional differences.3  
3 Hypothesis and data basis 
3.1 Hypothesis 
Considering the existing empirical evidence of chapter 2, the following hypotheses 
are put forward for the regression analyses. 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the share of white people in a county, the higher the share 
of votes for Trump. 
White people are expected to have a tendency to vote for Donald Trump. A large 
number of studies confirm the idea that ethnical affiliations correlate with voting 
decisions (Jones et al. 2015, Hetherington/Engelhardt 2016, Irwin/Katz 2016). 
Hypothesis 2: An increasing share of evangelical Protestants has a positive influence 
on votes for Trump. 
An increasing proportion of evangelical Protestants should lead to a greater number 
of votes for Trump (Pew Research Center 2016). The reason for this expectation is 
the high racial resentments of white evangelical Republicans in connection with the 
fear to become a majority-minority, which make Trump interesting for them, because 
of his race-oriented statements (Hetherington/Engelhardt 2016, Nteta/Schaffner 
2016). On the other hand Irwin and Katz (2016) find a negative correlation but this 
survey only examined the first 23 elections and the variable included only anglo-
saxon people (see also Gallup 2016). 
Hypothesis 3: More veterans in a county will lead to more votes for Trump. 
A further positive correlation is highly probable between Veterans and Trumps 
success. Several studies back this proposition (Shane/Altman 2016, 
Gamino/Clement 2016, Harris 2016). For instance, Trump suggests a reform of the 
                                                     
3 Several other papers exist scrutinizing distinct aspects. For instance, Oliver and Rahn (2016) 
underline the ethnocentric identity of Trump supporters. But their analysis concentrates on the 
relevance of “populism” based on a quantitative content analysis of the announcement speeches of 
the candidates. 
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veterans’ administration to improve their situation and only intends to enter into 
conflicts that make America safer as a nation (Trump 2016a, Trump 2016b).  
Hypothesis 4: A low education level goes hand in hand with more votes for Trump  
It is expected that people without a college degree prefer Donald Trump. One 
specialty of Trump is his simple language (Oliver/Rahn 2016, Swaim 2016). 
Emphasizing key words which are mostly in the end of a sentence, avoiding 
subordinate sentences and the usage of short sentences are typical for him and 
untypical for “ordinary” politicians. Especially white men with no college degree suffer 
from globalization due to falling employment numbers in the field of manufacturing 
(Thompson 2016). Donald Trump is constantly talking about those problems and 
accordingly, this frustration of the people without a college degree is likely to be 
expressed by supporting Donald Trump. 
Hypothesis 5a: High unemployment leads to more votes for Trump. 
Hypothesis 5b: A low income per household increases Trumps vote share. 
It is assumed that Trump´s support will grow with higher unemployment rates and low 
income per household. Both variables represent the people in the most sensitive 
situations: People and families without income and low income. A low or no income 
leads to a lot of frustration. Since 1980, the mortality rate for middle-aged white 
people is increasing (Khazan 2015). Causes are often alcohol, drugs and suicide, 
what indicates high dissatisfaction with one’s life. One explanation for this 
dissatisfaction might be financial problems. The U.S. has lost millions of 
manufacturing jobs for people with non-college education since 2000. The numbers 
of jobs that involve working with one’s hands like construction or especially 
manufacturing are decreasing, what effects the white working class (Irwin/Katz 
2016). 
Hypothesis 6: The share of votes for Trump will be greater in less populated states.  
As a headline from an article of the Washington post says, there are two Americas, 
an urban one and a rural one (Bump 2014). This differentiation is explained by 
cultural differences. People in more rural areas tend to vote for republican nominees, 
where as in cities people are more liberal and vote for democratic politicians 
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(Hamilton 2006). Many other sources outline that Trump achieves better in regions 
with a low density of population (Bishop 2016). 
 
As additional control variables we include first the timing of the primaries. The longer 
Trump remained a competitor in the Republican primaries, the better his results could 
be in the later primaries and caucuses. Such a kind of bandwagon or momentum 
effect should be visible in the primaries due to their sequential nature. Despite the 
first primaries being held in Iowa and New Hampshire, they do not have the same 
impact on the following results compared to the later primaries. The Super Tuesday 
states may have a larger impact on Trumps´ vote share. Additionally, the later a 
primary election takes places, the fewer candidates have a possibility to win. 
Candidates usually stop their campaigns, when they have no chance to win. It is 
basically still possible to vote for a candidate that stopped his campaign, but if voters 
want to influence the election for the presidential candidate of their party, they vote 
e.g. for a certain candidate to prevent an undesirable candidate to make the race. 
These effects should be more pronounced the later a primary takes place. Thus, we 
conjecture a non-linear time effect on Trump´s vote share.  
Second, the US is a culturally and politically heterogeneous country. In general, it is 
possible to distinguish within the USA between nine census divisions that are 
subdivisions of four census regions (US Census Bureau 2017). But each state has its 
own government and its own political background and therefore it is straightforward 
to conduct the analysis by state and not just by more aggregated regions. Thus, we 
use a dummy variable for every state to control for regional specific impacts.  
Finally, the literature review gives way to the idea that complex relationships between 
these variables exist. Tentatively we consider the following interaction effects: ´White 
and Protestant´, ´White and Unemployment´ and ´White and Low Education´. 
 
3.2 Data basis 
Given the obvious failure of polls to predict voters support for Trump (Economist 
2016b, Graefe 2016), we use his actual vote shares in the Republican party´s 
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primaries at the most disaggregate level available, i.e. the county level.4 This implies 
that we have to rely on socio-demographic and economic information on this level at 
minimum.  
Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable name Description Unit 
Dependent variable 
Result Share of people who voted for Donald Trump. % of total voters 
participating in the 
Republican 
primary in a 
county 
Independent variables 
White  White non-Hispanic people.  % of total 
population of a 
county  
Evangelicals Evangelical Protestant denominations. There are 
146 different Evangelical Protestant denominations 
in the US. 
% of total 
population of a 
county  
Veterans Men and women who have served (even for a short 
time), but are not currently serving on active duty in 
the U.S. Army. 
% of total 
population of a 
county 
Low_Education People whose highest educational attainment is a 
high school degree. 
% of total 
population of a 
county  
Unemployment People who are over 16 years old and part of the 
civilian labour force but do not have a job. 
% of total 
population of a 
county  
Low_Income Households with an income lower than $25.000 per 
year. 
% of total 
population of a 
county  
Pop_Density People per square mile metric 
Date Counties of a state get the same number according 
to the chronological order of the primary elections of 
2016. 
ordinal 
States Dummy variable, every county of the same state 
gets the same number. 
nominal 
For the analysis, we use information of 44 out of 50 states. Our study bases on 2764 
counties from these 44 states. The United States of America consists of 50 states 
with 3144 counties or comparable units. Thus, this study contains about 88% of all 
                                                     
4 In fact all of the different approaches to predict Trumps´ presidential election results failed. This is 
true as to prediction markets, voter surveys, econometric models and expert judgements. In 
comparison, the econometric models outperformed the other techniques (Graefe 2016).  
11 
states and approximately 88% of all counties from the United States of America. 
Appendix 1 describes the reasons as to the exclusion of several states and counties. 
We use the results of Trump´s share of votes (in %) for each county as dependent 
variable. The independent variables related to hypotheses are ethnical and religious 
affiliation, military background, level of education, unemployment, level of income 
and population density. As control variables we include time, the date of the 
primaries and regions, i.e. the federal states. Table 1 explains the definitions of the 
dependent and the independent variables in more detail. 
The following Table 2 provides an overview of the mean, standard deviation 
minimum and maximum of our variables. The share of Trumps´ votes is limited to 7.6 
% in Madison county (Idaho) but reaches 94.6% in Poquoson city (Virginia). All the 
independent variables show a considerable amount of variation and indicate the 
great heterogeneity of socio-demographic circumstances and living conditions 
between counties in the US. Thus, our data at the county level are detailed enough to 
cover the very different characteristics of the electorate.  
Table 2: Data description
 
 
     Variable           Mean    Std. Dev.          Min          Max 
 
       Result        47.37442     15.86452          7.6         94.6 
        White        76.97858     19.96755          3.1         99.8 
 Evangelicals         24.2402     16.58369          .29          100 
     Veterans        10.18488     2.708517            0         26.3 
Low_Education        50.80959     10.52479         12.1         78.6 
 Unemployment        8.934081     3.632718            0         29.6 
   Low_Income         28.2089      8.17055          5.2         58.3 
         Date        8.171129     4.198998            1           17 
  Pop_Density        216.7855     1309.548     .1654651     48827.73 
 
4 Regression analysis 
First, we conducted a regression analysis with the variables based on our 
hypothesis, that is our core model (= model_1).5 This model includes the seven 
independent variables “White” to “Pop_Density”. The Breusch-Pagan and also the 
White-test indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity, therefore robust standard 
errors had to been used. Model 2 adds Date as an independent variable to control for 
possible momentum effects. Here, most likely a non-linear relation between the date 
                                                     
5 The results are obtained using Stata Version 14.0. 
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of a primary and Trumps´ vote share exists. Thus, this specification includes Date2, 
the quadratic figures of the variable Date. The following Table 3 gives an overview of 
these models. Model 3 extends this and incorporates state specific dummy variables 
to control for state related differences. For this model too, homoscedasticity has to be 
rejected. Moreover there is strong evidence of intra-state correlation of the residuals. 
Hence, we rely on cluster robust standard errors.  
All of our three models are significant at the 1-%-level. The explained variance 
increases from rather modest 13% of Model 1 to about 69% in Model 2 up to 84% 
with regard to Model 3.  
Moreover we use different approaches to detect influential observations and outliers. 
In a lot of counties the standardized residuals and CooksD exceed the usual 
thresholds. The same result holds as to several coefficient estimates using Dfbetas. 
In order to check the robustness of the estimates Model 4 applies an iterative 
weighted robust regression (IWR) method (Hamilton 1991) and Model 5 presents the 
estimates of a least absolute deviation (LAD), i.e. median(50%-quantile)-regression 
(Cameron/Trivedi 2010: 211-222).  
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Table 3: Regression models 
 
 
 
               Model_1      Model_2      Model_3      Model_4      Model_5 
 
      Method     OLS          OLS          OLS          IWR           LAD 
                                                      Robust        Robust 
 
 
       White    0.0679      0.0442       0.0629        0.0539       0.0622 
               (0.016)     (0.011)      (0.021)       (0.008)      (0.020) 
                4.20***     4.16***      2.97***       6.62***      3.18*** 
              
 Evangelicals  -0.3076     -0.0096       -0.0317      -0.0520       -0.0446 
               (0.019)     (0.014)       (0.029)      (0.009)       (0.022) 
               -16.33***    -0.71        -1.10        -5.81***      -2.01** 
              
    Veterans    0.663       0.466         0.382        0.539        0.488 
               (0.121)     (0.079)       (0.156)      (0.043)      (0.101) 
                5.46***     5.93***       2.45**      12.52***      4.83*** 
 
Low_Education    0.037      0.2335        0.216        0.284        0.279 
                (0.041)    (0.028)       (0.057)      (0.014)      (0.034) 
                 0.89       8.29***       3.76***      20.39***     8.28*** 
 
Unemployment     0.339      0.612         0.183        0.230        0.293 
                (0.104)    (0.064)       (0.070)      (0.042)      (0.059) 
                 3.24***    9.49***       2.63***      5.45***      4.97*** 
              
  Low_Income     0.353      0.196         0.266        0.232        0.217 
                (0.059)    (0.039)       (0.075)      (0.020)      (0.041) 
                 6.01***    5.06***       3.58***     11.74***      5.33*** 
                
 Pop_Density     0.0006      0.0006       .0002        0.00004      0.0002 
                (0.00037)   (0.00032)    (0.000096)   (0.00008)    (0.00044) 
                  1.66*      1.83*         1.85*        0.52        0.38 
 
        Date        -        0.374       -13.443      -12.552        5.122 
                            (0.157)       (0.496)      (0.745)      (0.409) 
                             2.39**     -27.08***     -16.85***     12.53*** 
 
       Date2        -        0.137        0.866        0.814       -0.133 
                            (0.008)      (0.023)      (0.039)      (0.020) 
                            16.63***     38.00***      20.78***    -6.58*** 
                           
State dummies      No    No     Yes         Yes    Yes 
                                                                        
     Constant    27.877      1.845       64.071       57.757       -7.584 
                 (2.611)    (1.768)      (3.502)      (3.382)      (2.395) 
                 10.68***    1.04        18.29***     17.08***     -3.17*** 
      
 
          R
2
      0.132       0.686       0.842        0.723       0.832 
 Adjusted R
2
      0.130       0.685       0.839          -           - 
          F      58.01***   707.43***    288.44***     468.75***     - 
          N       2764        2764        2764         2764         2764 
 
Notes: Coefficient/Robust standard errors in parentheses/t-value 
Level of significance: ***1%-, **5%-, *10%-level 
Robust standard errors: Model_1 and Model_2: HC1-type, Model_3: Cluster robust clustered at the 
state level, Model_4: Standard errors are calculated using the pseudovalues approach (Street et al. 
1988), Model_5: Machado-Santos Silva method (Parente/Santos Silva 2016) Model_4: Robust 
regression-R2 (rregfit-procedure) 
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The variables White, Veterans, Low_Education, Unemployment and Low_Income are 
statistically significant at the 5-%-level across all the five models. The only exception 
is Low_Education in case of Model 1, which almost certainly suffers from 
misspecification, that is bias due to omitting time and regional influences. As we 
expected, these variables have a positive impact on Trump´s vote share. 
Against our hypothesis Trump’s election success cannot be explained by the variable 
Evangelicals. Its significance level depends on the model and in our preferred Model 
3 (see below) it is not significant at the 10-% level. Neglecting the statistical 
significance it turns out to have even a negative impact. One approach to this result 
is that Trumps strongest competitor, Ted Cruz, who considers himself a very religious 
person, convinced more evangelical Protestants to vote for him instead for Trump. In 
addition especially highly religious voters had concerns whether Trump is a proper 
candidate (Gallup, 2016).  
Tentatively, we add the three interaction variables White*Evangelicals, 
White*Unemployment and White*Low_Education. All of these interaction variables 
are not significant and do not improve the model fit. 
Population density (Pop_Density) has no relation to votes for Trump. In all our 
models it fails to be significant at the 5-%-level. Ignoring this result, contrary to our 
hypothesis the coefficient is positive.  But non-linear impacts are plausible as to 
population density. Therefore, we specify the reciprocal value of Pop_Density and 
also a log-log model to check for non-linear relations. These models do not reveal 
significant impacts of Pop-Density (we skip the depiction of the results). Thus, density 
effects per se are not relevant controlling the impact of the other variables (i.e. White 
to Low_Income and state dummies). Living in a rural community with a low 
population density has no own separate effect. Sociodemographic characteristics 
and economic situation turn out to be the relevant factors. 
As to the practical importance of our statistically significant variables we use Beta 
coefficients (again not depicted for sake of brevity). Here, Low_Education has the 
largest Beta coefficient (0.143).  Thus, a one standard deviation increase in 
Low_Education leads to a 0.143 standard deviation increase in the predicted vote 
share of Trump. Low_Income has the second most important impact (0.138). At the 
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other extreme, a one standard deviation increase in Unemployment rises Trumps´ 
vote share by only 0.042 standard deviations.  
The impact of the variables Date and Date2 are significant (1-% level). But the 
coefficients change signs with regard to the five models in Table 3. Testing Models 2 
and 3 for multicollinearity shows that our specifications are strongly affected. The 
mean VIF of Model 3 is almost 48 and multicollinearity affects the variables Date, 
Date2 and several states. In this respect, the estimations of Model 3 to 5 differ as to 
the (forced) exclusion of different states due to multicollinearity.  Hence, with our data 
set it is impossible to isolate the impact of the variable Date and Date2 on one hand 
and several states on the other hand.  
Finally we explore state specific differences. Leaving the time variables out of 
consideration and instead including the states leads to an adjusted R2 of 84% (not 
presented in Table 3). Subsequently adding the variables Date and Date2 only 
eliminates two states because of multicollinearity but does not improve the coefficient 
of determination. Model 2 alternatively considers date related effects instead of 
controlling for states. It gives an adjusted R2 of only 68%. Therefore, in comparison 
state specific differences play a dominant role. 
Appendix 2 depicts the specific influences of the federal states. Digging deeper as to 
the means of Trump´s votes in these states we use an analysis of covariance and 
adjust for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni-method). This reveals that most of these 
differences between the federal states are significant on the 1-%-level.6 
 
5 Conclusion and critical appraisal 
Before the Presidential Primaries began Trump was seen as an underdog with poor 
chances of winning – not to speak of winning the presidential elections. A lot of 
articles have been published since his surprising victories in the primaries about his 
followers and the mindset of people who vote for Trump. But there are only few 
studies dealing in depth with this topic. This nationwide analysis aims to work on this 
research gap. 
                                                     
6 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Our regression results confirm several widespread conjectures. The racial 
background as to white people, a low educational background, a high level of 
unemployment and a low family income lead to more votes for Trump. Furthermore, 
the regression analyses find a clear tendency of military veterans to support Trump. 
These variables predict Trump´s vote share controlling for state specific influences. 
Interestingly, these sociodemographic factors are statistically highly significant but 
only have a very limited relevance compared to regional differences. 
The proportion of evangelical Protestants is not significant or may even have a 
negative impact. One explanation is that the variable Evangelicals covers 146 
different Evangelical Protestant denominations (Association of Religion Data 
Archives 2010). Since all of them have more or less different kinds of beliefs, it is not 
precise to use only one denomination. Moreover, here our data may be flawed. This 
is possible, because of the definition: Evangelicals comprise people attending those 
services as a share of the population. These estimated figures are prone to errors 
and biases. 
A striking finding is that there are no rural or urban effects. The population density 
does not play a role besides and above the sociodemographic and regional factors.  
The existence of a momentum (bandwagon) effect remains an open question. A 
correlation between Trump´s election results and the temporarily succession of the 
voting states is probable. But our data set does not allow to discriminate between 
time-related effects and state specific influences. This is due to the fact that the 
primaries in all the counties of a state take place at the same date. Moreover in some 
states the primaries are conducted at the same time. This leads to the problems of 
multicollinearity mentioned above. 
Above all, our study underpins that the United States of America are no homogenous 
country. Hence, regression analyses require controlling for regional differences. The 
results underline the tremendous relevance of state specific impacts to predict voting 
behavior. Its practical significance dominates all other factors. This corroborates 
results in the literature. For instance, Fisher (2016) finds that state political culture 
plays an important role for Donald Trump´s vote shares in a particular state. 
In this regard the question arises if states are a useful bundling of regional clusters. 
Besides the aforementioned census regions and census divisions other regional 
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delineations are possible. These are e.g. the eight economic regions of the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA 2017) or the “Nine Nations of North America” (Garreau 
1981). The former relies on economic characteristics the latter bases mainly on 
culture and values. In this respect rather different clusters are at hand. Another 
suggestion to map regional cultures consists of eleven regions. Woodard 
distinguishes eleven nations in the U.S. based on political, ethnical and ethnographic 
characteristics (Woodard 2011: 1-2). On the other hand the federal states may be an 
administrative boundary incorporating very diverse cultural entities. In this respect 
more disaggregated regions, e.g. the Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA) might be 
more adequate (US Bureau of Census 2017b). 
Further lines of research as to Trump´s success include the link between political 
party identification for GOP and people´s feelings about candidate affects (Jacobson 
2016) or the influence of new Social media with regard to voter´s preferences 
(Oates/Moe 2016, Wang et al. 2016). Possibly a complex interaction of race, 
education and unemployment goes in hand with regional differences related to 
cultural and historical reasons (Katz/Irwin 2016). 
In this respect, Trump bundled several items crucial for specific electorial groups and 
did not present a coherent political program. The most relevant of these special 
interest groups are “anti-immigrationists”, “anti-globalizationists” (= “old-industry-
loosers”) and “anti-establishment-partisans”. These “soft factors”, such as 
dissatisfaction and lost trust in the establishment are very hard to measure and put 
into variables, but assumingly take a big part of why people vote for Trump. Summing 
up, the “Case of Trump” not only poses an important political challenge but also a 
defiance in empirical research. 
A further extension to distinguish state and time related influences in the primaries 
would be the use of the outcomes of the presidential elections of November 2016. 
The relative share of Trump´s votes in this election between the states could be used 
as an indicator of cultural differences. In a Bayesian regression approach it would be 
possible to use this a-priori information to control for cultural differences in the 
primaries, thus identifying possible momentum impacts.  
Several publications claim that in addition to our exogenous variables a low health 
status has an important (Gou 2016a, Guo 2016b) or even dominant (Economist 
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2016b) positive influence on Trump´s vote share. The inclusion of such indicator 
variables, e.g. obesity, diabetes or mortality rates of people ages below 65, is an 
interesting extension of our analysis. However, the empirical evidence in the medical 
literature underlines the impact of education on health and not vice versa, the so-
called “Social Gradient” (Donkin 2014). Thus it is a question of further research if 
variables of health status add predictive power beside education or not.    
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Appendix 1: Data set delineations, sources and cleansing 
Alaska, Kansas and Minnesota conducted a primary election, but these states do not 
display their results on county-level. Instead they have Congressional Districts, which 
are not comparable with counties, because they are much bigger. Colorado and 
North Dakota selected their delegates at a state-wide convention. Wyoming 
conducted a winner-takes-all caucus, which means that no results at the county level 
are available. Hence, all these states are not part of our analysis. In addition, the 
District of Columbia (Washington D.C.) is not a federal state of the United States of 
America and does not belong to any federal state. It directly reports to the congress 
of the Unites States. Thus, it is also excluded. 
Moreover, the following Counties are excluded from this survey because a lack of 
usable data: Carroll County (Arkansas), Kalawao County (Hawaii), Clark County 
(Idaho), Arthur County and Logan County (Nebraska), Petroleum County (Montana), 
Buffalo County (South Dakota), Zavala County and Kenedy County (Texas), Dagget 
County, Juab County, Morgan County, Piute County and Rich County (Utah) and 
lastly Essex County and Grand Isle County (Vermont). 
The data for the endogenous variable in this study was retrieved from New York 
Times and Politico (New York Times, 2016; Politico, 2016). The exogenous variables 
Veterans, Low_Education, Unemployment, Density, White and Low_Income are 
referable to the Census Bureau (US Census Bureau 2016). The data for the variable 
Evangelicals are retrieved from the Association of Religion Data Archives (2016). For 
states, all counties of the same state have the same number. The data variable is an 
integer number for each day an election took place. The counties in the state with the 
first election got the number 1 and so on (for example the Super Tuesday 
states/counties all have the same number). Data correction was necessary as to the 
variable Evangelicals. Here two counties (Fredericksburg City, Virginia, and Harmon 
county, Oklahoma) had a proportion of Evangelicals exceeding 100 % 
(Fredericksburg City: 103.57, Harmon county: 130.87). The figures refer to adherents 
attending Evangelical services as a share of the population, who may be residents of 
the neighboring counties (Association of Religion Data Archives 2016). In both cases 
this number was set to 100. 
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Appendix 2: The impact of the federal states 
 
 
Model_3 of Table 2 depicting the federal states 
Number of obs =    2764 
R-squared     =  0.8417 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
       Result |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        White |   .0629122   .0211627     2.97   0.005     .0202336    .1055908 
 Evangelicals |   -.031735   .0289599    -1.10   0.279    -.0901382    .0266682 
     Veterans |   .3819737   .1561267     2.45   0.019     .0671142    .6968333 
Low_Education |   .2159804    .057428     3.76   0.001     .1001658     .331795 
 Unemployment |   .1831225   .0696276     2.63   0.012     .0427051    .3235399 
   Low_Income |   .2675628   .0747717     3.58   0.001     .1167714    .4183543 
      Density |   .0001794   .0000968     1.85   0.071    -.0000157    .0003746 
         Date |  -13.44276    .496494   -27.08   0.000    -14.44403   -12.44148 
        Date2 |   .8659471   .0227878    38.00   0.000     .8199912     .911903 
              | 
     Arizona  |   8.102098   .6826064    11.87   0.000     6.725491    9.478705 
    Arkansas  |  -11.70907   .2773339   -42.22   0.000    -12.26837   -11.14977 
    California|  -32.77878   1.728195   -18.97   0.000    -36.26401   -29.29354 
   Connecticut|   8.540752   .6213004    13.75   0.000      7.28778    9.793724 
      Delaware|   9.627238   .8826166    10.91   0.000     7.847272     11.4072 
      Florida |   8.324027   .5126785    16.24   0.000     7.290112    9.357942 
       Georgia|  -1.474405   .3956372    -3.73   0.001    -2.272284   -.6765268 
      Hawaii  |   12.71122   1.206284    10.54   0.000     10.27852    15.14392 
        Idaho |  -9.293584   .5283779   -17.59   0.000    -10.35916   -8.228008 
     Illinois |   2.189092    .124162    17.63   0.000     1.938695    2.439488 
      Indiana |  -7.465641   .3739973   -19.96   0.000    -8.219879   -6.711404 
        Iowa  |  -51.09433   2.354818   -21.70   0.000    -55.84328   -46.34539 
     Kentucky |   -6.44261   .5489969   -11.74   0.000    -7.549768   -5.335452 
    Louisiana |   -.290113   .3938653    -0.74   0.465    -1.084418     .504192 
        Maine |  -10.70741   .9939382   -10.77   0.000    -12.71188   -8.702945 
     Maryland |   6.521519   .7376921     8.84   0.000     5.033821    8.009217 
 Massachusetts|   7.280751   .9616835     7.57   0.000     5.341332    9.220171 
    Michigan  |  -1.792812   .6033954    -2.97   0.005    -3.009674   -.5759487 
  Mississippi |   8.576739   .7960305    10.77   0.000      6.97139    10.18209 
    Missouri  |   3.072759   .3466237     8.86   0.000     2.373726    3.771793 
      Montana |  -37.69779   1.369802   -27.52   0.000    -40.46026   -34.93532 
      Nebraska|  -6.631008   .8975638    -7.39   0.000    -8.441118   -4.820898 
      Nevada  |  -9.539729   1.793862    -5.32   0.000     -13.1574   -5.922061 
New Hampshire |  -31.03503   2.250937   -13.79   0.000    -35.57448   -26.49558 
    New Jersey|  -28.19034   1.775794   -15.87   0.000    -31.77157   -24.60911 
    New Mexico|  -42.89561   1.636731   -26.21   0.000    -46.19639   -39.59483 
      New York|   9.505675   .2794806    34.01   0.000     8.942049     10.0693 
North Carolina|    4.82399   .3936035    12.26   0.000     4.030213    5.617767 
        Ohio  |  -2.250446   .5542279    -4.06   0.000    -3.368153   -1.132739 
     Oklahoma |  -14.37578    .434579   -33.08   0.000    -15.25219   -13.49937 
       Oregon |  -15.77184   .8695526   -18.14   0.000    -17.52546   -14.01822 
  Pennsylvania|   4.051262   .3544331    11.43   0.000     3.336479    4.766045 
  Rhode Island|   9.760407   .5425649    17.99   0.000     8.666221    10.85459 
South Carolina|  -24.53144   .9849235   -24.91   0.000    -26.51773   -22.54516 
  South Dakota|  -43.92947   1.438313   -30.54   0.000    -46.83011   -41.02884 
     Tennessee|   -3.97033   .4599199    -8.63   0.000    -4.897847   -3.042813 
       Texas  |  -15.45749   .5762577   -26.82   0.000    -16.61963   -14.29536 
         Utah |  -16.66636   .4826749   -34.53   0.000    -17.63977   -15.69296 
       Vermont|    -10.871   1.096747    -9.91   0.000     -13.0828   -8.659196 
     Virginia |   5.132275    .716315     7.16   0.000     3.687688    6.576862 
   Washington |  -18.88855   1.236075   -15.28   0.000    -21.38133   -16.39577 
 West Virginia|          0  (omitted) 
    Wisconsin |          0  (omitted) 
              | 
        _cons |   64.07088   3.502378    18.29   0.000     57.00766     71.1341 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Notes: Coefficient/standard error/t-value/ empirical level of significance, 95% 
confidence interval. With regard to the impacts of the states Alabama is the reference 
category.
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